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The Decline of the Military Ethos and Profession of Arms: An Argument against Autonomous Lethal Engagements
Lt Col Michael R. Contratto, USAF Throughout history many new weapon technologies have been introduced into combat prior to a full evaluation or understanding of the doctrinal, legal, and ethical implications of their use. 1 Similarly, today's battlespace is witnessing the introduction of numerous robotic systems to conduct many military missions. Thus far these robots still operate with humans directly "in the loop" of the decision process-especially when that loop is part of an offensive kill chain. 2 The future battlespace, if we allow it, will be quite different. While the exact year is still in doubt, the capability for robotic autonomous lethal engagements will eventually exist and possibly much sooner than many may think. 3 Placing worries of "Skynet" achieving consciousness and bands of "Terminators" running amok aside, as military science and sociology fuse, we truly find ourselves on the cusp of a "brave new world" in warfare. 4 The research question this paper addresses is what are the key military ethical issues of totally removing, other than the initial programming of the autonomous agent, the human in the loop of offensive kill chains? The specifics of how the technology is developed or what form it takes are not germane to this paper. 5 Definitions are important; within this paper, ALE is the application of lethal force by a robotic or computer system which solely relies upon its own internal programming and capabilities to conduct and execute all elements of the kill chain. 6 For the purposes of framing the discussion and analysis later in the paper, a very futuristic autonomous lethal engagement (ALE) scenario is introduced here. The year is 20XX and as tensions between BadGuyLand and the United States are on the rise, a US remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) conducts a covert operation over a military installation that is home to 10,000 ground combat troops of the potential enemy. Over the base the RPA releases 2,000 lethal nanorobots which bury themselves into the dirt and go into a dormant mode. US intelligence services have gained access to the genetic database of the enemy's Army soldiers and the nanorobots are programmed with this information which allows them to take a quick DNA sample and validate its discrimination algorithm before taking lethal action. Six months later and for just reasons, the United States formally declares war on BadGuyLand and, as the enemy ground troops mobilize for immediate deployment, activates 1,000 of the nanorobots which complete their mission and kill 1,000 soldiers. The Programmed with rules of engagement (ROE), laws of armed conflict (LOAC), conventions, and heuristics, an ethical black box within the ALE system independently evaluates each step of the kill chain and decides when and whether to engage an intended target with lethal force.
Simply stated, there is no "human in the loop" other than the original manufacturing, programming, and introduction of the system into the combat zone.
United States promises more of the same within the next hour which causes BadGuyLand to sue for peace.
My thesis is that while the outcome of offensive ALE may largely be considered amoral (death of a combatant resulting from a cruise missile strike or a robot is really no different), the act itself is contrary to military ethics and detrimental to the military profession and thus should be prohibited. Another key definition to frame the ensuing deconstruction is that of ethics-which can be broadly stated to be "the study of good and evil, of right and wrong, of duty and obligation in human conduct, and the reasoning and choice about them." 7
ALE and Just War Theory
To develop my thesis, three primary analytical filters are used: (1) the traditional concepts of Just War Theory, (2) assignment of moral agency, and (3) the professions of arms and the military ethos. My framework will highlight some of the major debates and issues using the first two filters, assume that legal guidance and sound doctrine can overcome these issues, and then focus on the third filter as the primary argument against ALE. As the analytical foundation is laid throughout the essay, key implications will be raised along with several recommendations.
Most ethical analyses of ALE begin with an evaluation against the precepts of Just War Theory. Elements of contemporary just war thought trace their roots to Saint Augustine some 1,600 years ago. Although the addition of increasingly complex technology to the battlespace has at times challenged the interpretation and application of just war precepts, for the most part the just war body of knowledge has remained relatively consistent. The theory's main components generally include seven jus ad bellum considerations (acceptable justifications to use armed force and declare war) and two principle jus in bello considerations (acceptable conduct in war). 8
Jus ad bellum
A literature search of the ethical considerations of ALE in the context of Just War Theory actually reveals much debate, deep thought, and extensive analysis of the issue on the part of science fiction writers, roboticists, philosophers, and the occasional professional military education student.
The seven generally accepted tenants of jus ad bellum include the requirement for a just cause, proportionality (good of war aims overrides the general evil the war will cause), a legitimate authority to declare war, a reasonable chance of success in war, right intention, war declared as a last resort, and the goal of a just peace. 9 At first glance, since jus ad bellum is mainly concerned with the decision to go to war, the use of ALE in war would seem to present little direct conflict with any of these requirements. Upon deeper reflection however, several vexing issues quickly surface. With our military establishment increasingly relying upon systems of systems to manage and prosecute warfare, ALE has the potential to leapfrog the entire requirement for a state's legitimate authority to choose when and where the use of military force is warranted. 10 One does not have to rely on extreme scenarios or rogue computers to envision a chain of events in which an ALE weapon system may conduct an action that could lead to war. 11 In addition to legitimate authority concerns, Peter Asaro represents a group of ALE opponents whose position can be summarized as presenting a jus ad bellum argument against ALE because it limits the risk to nations and their soldiers to such an extent that it significantly removes political barriers and lowers the bar for proper authorities to declare and enter war.
Even if the ALE followed established ROE and LOAC, the ALE may occur without the legitimate authority's knowledge or approval. And if so, the weapon system would usurp the legitimate authority's other jus ad bellum responsibilities and place a nation squarely on the brink of, if not in, war.
12 This nuanced argument maintains that ALE would skew the arithmetic of proportionality such that force may not be used as a last resort. 13 In other words, the use of ALE has the potential to dramatically reduce risk to combatants and make war less costly in terms of human capital and thus may increases the tendency to enter wars too willingly. In times of conflict, a natural tendency exists to put a greater value on the lives of our soldiers and citizens than the enemy's. If our expected costs of waging war are so low, statesmen may not adequately account for the costs of our adversary and society as a whole in the decision to declare war or use force. An important extension of this logic trail is that risk free war can eliminate the horrors of war and in so doing become a strong disincentive to seek a lasting jus in pace (just peace) in pursuit of tranquillitas ordinis (just societies). 14 Such misgivings do have overall merit in an ethical discussion of ALE. However, these discussions do not deductively determine whether the reasons for war or the use of ALE in war may be just or not and as such are somewhat misplaced. While these concerns are important and must be understood by the legitimate authority, the tenets of jus ad bellum should stand on their own merit. In fact, arguing that less risk to combatants leads to a greater likelihood of the use of force could be used as a tactic to oppose many improved weapon technologies. 15 The opposing perspective is that from the tip of the phalanx, to a sniper at several hundred meters, to an unmanned aerial system operator sipping coffee at Creech AFB, Nevada-isn't ALE simply the next evolutionary step in the pursuit of risk free war? 16 Regardless, the overarching concern still remains valid; thus two formally stated jus ad bellum implications of developing and employing ALE are that its introduction may lead to a greater willingness to declare war or use lethal force to satisfy political objects and its advent has the potential to change the nature and character of war unlike any other technology to date. To address these implications, legal and doctrinal For the military, the full impact of this question is better evaluated in terms of the overall context of the profession of arms and military ethos rather than jus ad bellum.
guidance is needed-guidance that unfortunately does not currently exist.
How we fight our nation's battles is "built upon social, cultural, and ethical norms that are very specific to a time and culture," so ALE represents the deliberate pursuit of a revolutionary jump in warfare. 17 The negative effects of employing ALE on our long term strategic position in the current world environment are difficult to predict. But given recent experience, continuing our conventional dominance on the battlefield through ALE will likely increase the stability/instability paradox we now experience and force our adversaries to fight even more asymmetric and 
Jus in Bello
Jus in bello is primarily concerned with two key criteriaproportionality and discrimination. Proportionality prohibits unnecessary violence and dictates a level of force in war that is proportional to the goals sought. 24 Proportionality requires the use of violence calibrated to justice or, more colloquially, you can't use a nuke to eliminate a sniper. 25 Additionally, discrimination mandates that noncombatants must not be intentionally killed. Subtler jus in bello concepts regarding the principles of double effect and double intent factor into the calculus of the use of force as well. 26 The professional community is divided on the question of whether an ALE system could ever satisfy a strict interpretation of proportionality and discrimination criteria. Many argue that it is simply impossible to ethically code a robot's black box with enough moral values and situational awareness to make ethically sound discrimination and proportionality decisions. 27 Yet others, championed by Ronald C. Arkin, an ALE proponent conducting DOD sponsored research, claim otherwise.
Arkin believes that "ethical governors" can eventually be programmed with the complete LOAC, the Geneva Conventions, and theater specific ROE that would give robots the capability to perform ethically better than humans. 28 He confidently states "it is not my belief that unmanned systems will be able to be perfectly ethical in the battlefield, but I am convinced that they can perform more ethically than human soldiers are capable of." 29 He then uses a 2007 Office of the Surgeon General, US Army Medical Command report citing numerous ethical violations on the Iraqi battlefield to bolster his assertion. 30 Imagine then an ALE robotic system that does not get tired, afraid, hungry, or homesick; and does not express feelings of adrenaline fed rage, guilt, hatred, and revenge for killed buddies. The system is programmed without the need or concern for self-defense and selfpreservation. These robots don't draw salary, benefits, or pensions nor incur physical and psychological damage in war. They are more effective, efficient, and less costly to the environment. The logical question becomes if ALE technology could spare our military members from the ravages of war and reduce war crimes, are we not morally obligated to pursue such capability? 31 While this utopian vision may appeal to many, such grandiose hyperbole, especially in the early development of any new technology, should surely be treated with a healthy dose of skepticism-Murphy will be alive and well. In fact, the disparity of considered opinion on the issue should serve as a forewarning that if ALE technology is employed in combat, its early introduction will come with high risk for failures in discrimination and proportionality calculations. Thus ALE capability development must follow a very slow and incremental crawl, walk, run, maturation process. Furthermore, the keystone of any ALE system's test and evaluation program would be exhaustive and complicated scenariobased operational evaluations to extensively validate discrimination and proportionality algorithms. 32
Moral Agency
For the sake of continued argument, assume that an ALE system can satisfy jus in bello proportionality and discrimination criteria. What then is the next major ethical hurdle to the employment of ALE?
The ability to assign moral agency represents the next hurdle.
Though not specifically called out in any of the ad bellum or in bello criteria, society has traditionally assumed that a moral agent exists (or that at least an adequate level of moral agency can be assigned) in the application of lethal force. 33 Using a moral agent, act, and outcome framework highlights the ALE dilemma of assigning moral agency. Ethically is there any difference Although societal and international norms today do accept a great degree of indirectness in the assignment of moral agency while applying lethal force, this acceptance is not without limits.
In fact, a lack of direct moral agency can contribute to putting weapon technologies, such as landmines, off limits. Therefore it becomes important to be able to assign moral agency with an acceptable level of directness in two broad ALE situations: (1) the textbook, error free use of ALE; and more importantly, (2) in the event that the robot "misbehaves" and violates some ROE, LOAC, or jus in bello principle.
in the outcome of a successful lethal cruise missile strike launched from several hundred kilometers away or by a robot employing ALE? The enemy is dead in both scenarios (outcome) and with varying degrees of directness, a human was involved in the killing by creating the weapon system and "employing" its capability. Ethically, is there any difference in a slight modification to the scenario where an unintentional cruise missile component failure or the ALE robot's misapplication of discrimination directly leads to noncombatant deaths? Again the outcome is the same. The two scenarios and examples within each subtly differ and highlight the different aspects of an implicit requirement that a responsible moral agent exists for the actions taken in the conduct of war, especially when something goes wrong or atrocities occur.
Textbook Application
In the first scenario, since a person tasked with adhering to LOAC and ROE remains in the cruise missile kill chain, direct moral agency for the application of lethal force can be assigned (the person who launched the missile). Who then is the moral agent for the ALE robot that correctly applies lethal force-the robot, the commander who employed the system, or the engineer or programmer? Again experts widely disagree.
Some claim no one can "justly be held responsible," thus the general use of ALE is automatically unjust and unethical. 34 Others have no qualm assigning responsibility to the robot itself. 35 Even if ethically programmed, I agree that the robot is "off the hook" regarding ethical responsibility. Furthermore, although a high degree of direct moral agency does not exist, it does lie somewhere between the two extremes (no one or the robot) at an Aristotelian golden mean. So, assigning moral agency to the soldier or commander who employed the system (similar to the cruise missile example) would not make ALE unethical in a strict legal sense. The strength of this argument predominantly rests upon the assumption that the ALE robot is capable of applying discrimination and proportionality criteria as well as, if not better than, humans.
War Crime
In the second scenario, if an ALE robot committed what would be considered a war crime, the tougher question becomes who can be held responsible for the resultant atrocities? Combining the legal principles of diminished responsibility and product liability, along with the long held principle of a commander's accountability, I believe wronged parties could achieve due recourse in the event an ALE robot mistakenly killed noncombatants or committed war crimes. 36 Outside of the additional consideration of including a degree of contractual liability on the manufacturer, this approach is consistent with how we treat other forms of technology and the principle of the nontransferable nature of accountability on the part of the commander. 37 To formally satisfy moral agency questions if ALE algorithms fail, future employment of ALE will also require a thorough legal review to determine the appropriate combination of product liability and diminished responsibility on part of concerned parties (manufacturer, engineer, programmer, and commander) that supports assigning a legally sufficient level of moral agency.
Let us optimistically assume that future ALE robots possess thoroughly tested and robust jus in bello proportionality and discrimination abilities and an international legal review and subsequent codification accepts that sufficient direct moral agency can be assigned to the textbook application of ALE. Let us further assume that legal reviews and international norms accept that a worst case failure of an ALE system leading to innocent deaths is a relatively amoral outcome. An outcome chalked up to the extreme fog and friction of war or to unforeseen and unintended failures such as when a cruise missile component breaks. Should we then vigorously pursue the use of ALE? A slight change in perspective of the assignment of moral agency serves as the key ethical filter to address ALE's fitness for use in an offensive capacity.
The Profession of Arms and Military Ethics
Although international legal review might accept a sufficient level of moral agency to support ALE's general use as well as adequate accountability and recourse for restitution involving war crimes, from the military perspective this should not be the final or even the most important critical evaluation. The key issue remains that other than introducing the ALE system to the battlespace, at no point in the kill chain does an individual soldier hold the responsibility for the act that requires moral agency. A more appropriate analytical filter for this absolute lack of direct moral agency in committing the act of offensive lethal force resides within the larger context of military ethics and the profession of arms.
Profession of Arms
It is not trite to pose the following foundational questions-would it be considered honorable for the profession of arms to resort to the use of ALE? Does such technology cross the line into unprofessional behavior?
If so, what are the implications? Martin Cook asserts that the profession of arms' foundation does not simply rest upon flashy rhetoric but rather upon a strong moral basis rooted deep within our society. He writes, "Strong aspirations are the foundation of military virtues that preserve and sustain some of the noblest human values: to serve others even at the cost of personal sacrifice, and to discipline one's mind and body so that it serves a purpose larger than self and the pursuit of pleasure." 38 Similarly others emphasize that the essence of the military profession includes "the capacity to reason to efficacious decisions" of great moral import. 39 Our current obligation as a profession is to prepare for and wage the nation's wars and thus, by extension, our soldiers must be prepared to suffer, fight, kill, and die for their country. 40 Resorting to the use of ALE begins to chip away at the profession of arms' moral foundation by freely relinquishing our direct moral agency for war's most profound activities. If professions are "quintessentially" human institutions operating in areas "where humanity's most profound concerns arise" and we willingly relinquish the responsibility for the toughest decisions in our sphere of expertise, what do we say if someone asks, "How can I be a professional when there is no profession?" 41 The answer to and implications of this question are not trivial. Our military is a specialized culture separate from civil society with laws and traditions of our own. 42 As such our nation and civilian leaders trust us to act as the "moral agent of the American people" and grant us significant independence to do so. 43 At its core ALE may threaten this separateness and independence, sense of worth and self-esteem, and ultimately our status as a profession. Additionally, the military also requires a degree of moral independence and autonomy to be an effective servant of government. James Burk describes this requirement when he states that "military professions require autonomy, to include moral autonomy, to be competent actors held responsible for what they do."
We are self-forming and organizing with laws derived from and dictated by our nation's leaders and the US Constitution. 44 He lists this autonomy as "a precondition for responsible obedience" and "on which the moral responsibility of the military profession depends." 45 Likewise, Anthony Hartle claims that the most significant aspect of being a professional is the "existence of a particular moral relationship between the professional and the society within which he or she functions." 46 Applying these philosophic strains to ALE, if we freely give away our moral autonomy to robots or computers, we are in danger of giving up a huge chunk of the moral responsibility that secures our existence as a profession and subordinates us to the nation we are sworn to defend Nor is it a simple romanticization of war. For over two centuries honorable and brave Soldiers, forged in the crucible of fighting our nation's wars, have returned home and served as a key ingredient in our nation's moral stock-a stock that infuses our society and is passed down through generations. Today we are better service members, patriots, and Americans because Airman believed in a cause greater than self and freely took to the skies over Nazi Germany decades ago. While atrocities and war crimes unfortunately still occur, we nevertheless remain a more ethically attuned military because service members today, like generations before us, exercise ethical fitness while facing moral dilemmas at the strategic, operational, and very personal level of war.
Resorting to the use of ALE foreshadows a future decline in military ethics and climate of ethical laziness. At the extremes of ethical laziness lurks a fear that risk free war will create huge physical and psychological disconnects between the exercise of lethal force and those who prosecute it and a lack of empathy for those who it is waged upon. 54 Finally, Hartle writes that one purpose of professional ethics is to "delineate the moral authority for actions necessary to the professional function but generally impermissible in moral terms" and as such the ethical code "may thus both prohibit and permit various morally significant actions." 55 It is partially within this authority that doctors are allowed to prescribe dangerous and addictive drugs, lawyers can conceal facts of crime committed by a client, policeman and fireman make life and death decisions in the conduct of their duties, and the military fights and kills in the conduct of war. We should be no more eager to give up this weighty responsibility to an autonomous agent than doctors would forgo their responsibility to operate, lawyers to defend, or judges to adjudicate.
The rise of killer robots will inevitably lead to a decrease in the need for traditional military skills and virtues. Soldiers will become too distanced and desensitized both emotionally and physically from war, with a subsequent decline of military ethos, increasing ethical laziness, and lack of self-determined action. 56 Indeed ALE technologies represent the precipice of desensitization to violence since in a robot war few remain to be desensitized. In this new warfare reality anyone could command killer robots, and the military professional in full regalia might as well be a white-coated, robotics engineer. 57 Writing on the quest for bloodless war, Robert Mandel states, "from the military's own standpoint, perhaps the most disturbing prospect emerging from the quest for bloodless war is the potential erosion of the military ethos: the military ethic is built on the principles of self-sacrifice and mission accomplishment; troops are supposed to be willing to die so • Approximately 10 percent of Soldiers and Marines report mistreating noncombatants (damaged/destroyed Iraqi property when not necessary or hit/kicked a noncombatant when not necessary). Soldiers that have high levels of anger, experience high levels of combat, or those who screened positive for a mental health problem were nearly twice as likely to mistreat noncombatants as those who had low levels of anger or combat or screened negative for a mental health problem.
• Only 47 percent of Soldiers and 38 percent of Marines agreed that noncombatants should be treated with dignity and respect.
• Well over a third of Soldiers and Marines reported torture should be allowed, whether to save the life of a fellow Soldier or Marine or to obtain important information about insurgents.
• 17 percent of Soldiers and Marines agreed or strongly agreed that all noncombatants should be treated as insurgents.
• Fewer than 10 percent of Soldiers and Marines reported that their unit modifies the ROE to accomplish the mission.
• 45 percent of Soldiers and 60 percent of Marines did not agree that they would report a fellow Soldier/Marine if he had injured or killed an innocent noncombatant.
• Only 43 percent of Soldiers and 30 percent of Marines agreed they would report a unit member for unnecessarily damaging or destroying private property.
• Less than half of Soldiers and Marines would report a team member for an unethical behavior.
• A third of Marines and over a quarter of Soldiers did not agree that their NCOs and Officers made it clear not to mistreat noncombatants.
• Although they reported receiving ethical training, 28 percent of Soldiers and 31 percent of Marines reported facing ethical situations in which they did not know how to respond.
• Soldiers and Marines are more likely to report engaging in the mistreatment of Iraqi noncombatants when they are angry, and are twice as likely to engage in unethical behavior in the battlefield as when they have low levels of anger.
• Combat experience, particularly losing a team member, was related to an increase in ethical violations. 
